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The history of attempts to limit the methods and means of warfare illustrates
that agreed conventions can have a wide-ranging standard setting function
that goes far beyond their terms and signatories. The stigmatization of
certain categories of weapons has been a very important outcome of past
deliberations and international treaties.
States participating in the Oslo Process to prohibit cluster munitions that cause
unacceptable harm to civilians have an historic opportunity to develop the legal
protection afforded from the effects of certain weapons both during and after
conflict. This report examines the past role of international debate about the
means and methods of warfare in order to underscore this opportunity. It is
argued that a strong and comprehensive treaty, that will provide a clear basis
for monitoring of practice by States Parties and states not party alike, will
provide the best basis for the protection of civilians and for furthering
humanitarian conventions for the protection of civilians in the future.
2 a convention beyond the convention: stigma, humanitarian standards and the oslo process
The ongoing Oslo Process seeks to establish, by the end of 2008, a legally binding prohibition on the use, stockpiling,
production and transfer of cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.” The ‘treaty’ or ‘convention’
agreed in Dublin in May 2008 should represent the most significant achievement in humanitarian arms control in the
last decade.
A central point of deliberation in the process to date has been whether it is necessary that all or most major user,
stockpiler, and producer nations sign up to the agreed convention for it to result in improvement to the protection of
civilians.  To this end, some states have argued that the current ‘Draft Cluster Munitions Convention’ text should be
weakened so as to make it more likely that states either not currently taking part in the Oslo process, or those
expressing substantial reservations within it, will eventually sign up to the resulting convention. ‘Weakened’ in this
context means that the prohibition would apply to a narrower range of weapon systems than currently set out in the
draft text, it would be applied with less urgency, and the rules would be more tolerant of the use of cluster munitions
by states not party to the treaty.
However, past efforts to limit the methods and means of warfare illustrate that treaties and conventions can play a
wider ethical standard-setting function within the international community. Prohibition agreements have had
relevance far beyond their formal terms and official signatories. The stigmatization of certain categories of weapons
and methods of attack has been a very important outcome of past deliberations and international treaties. 
For instance, the case of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention illustrates how a widely subscribed to prohibition
can affect the practices of those outside the treaty. The history of attempts to prohibit chemical weapons illustrates
how deliberations, declarations, and treaties can have implications beyond the formal restrictions agreed. The
example of 20th century attempts to curtail the development and use of biological weapons demonstrates both the
possibility of international agreements affecting the practices of non-signatories to pertinent conventions as well as
the importance of these agreements beyond their formal provisions.1 The last 60 years of debate about the
appropriateness of nuclear weapons shows how a taboo can develop for the use of certain means of force that goes
beyond international restrictions. However, this latter example also sounds a cautionary note by indicating the
precarious standing of a stigmatization when the bounds of what should be prohibited are not clear or comprehensive
(either in terms of the prohibited technologies, or the prohibited practices.) 
Some of most destructive weapons have been rendered effectively out of use because of international ethical standards
about what constitutes acceptable practice. When the possession and use of certain weapons is seen as incompatible
with the identity a country wishes to foster in the international community, then this has contributed to restraint both
during the preparation for and during the conduct of warfare. When NATO’s ISAF command instituted a policy of no-use
of cluster munitions in Afghanistan it did so on the basis of concerns about the impact of these weapons on civilians.2
While the eventual international ethical standard given to cluster munitions will depend on many factors, a clear and
categorical prohibition through the Oslo Process is more likely than a complicated and qualified one to contribute to
the stigmatizing of these weapons.
In this regard, the current ‘Draft Cluster Munitions Convention’ text represents an important step forward. That this
text provides no exemptions from the ban for ‘acceptable cluster munitions’ but only allows exclusions for items that
are not considered to be ‘cluster munitions’ provides the sort of clear distinction needed for singling out this category
of weapon from others. Likewise, the requirement for states in the Oslo Process to argue for what exclusions should
be allowed rather than what should be prohibited provides a clear signal of the standing given to these weapons. To
foster the stigmatization of cluster munitions, it is important that any further exclusions are limited in number and
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scope and that, rather than providing opportunistic loopholes, they provide only for systems that are plausibly 
distinct from cluster munitions as they are widely understood.
In almost any likely future conflict scenarios, the use of cluster munitions as prohibited through the Oslo Process
would undermine claims for the legitimacy of that use of force even by a state not party to the treaty. While major
users of cluster munitions – such as the United States – show little interest in joining a prohibition in the near term,
they may well find themselves influenced by the outcome of the Dublin Conference whether they are formally signed
up to the resulting convention or not. History provides many reasons for thinking those states not party to the
prohibition on cluster munitions – in particular those with open and accountable systems of government – will 
be affected by it in any case. Some have suggested this may be part of the reason why the US and others remaining
outside the Oslo Process have engaged more actively in the CCW on cluster munitions in order to seek a protocol 
or other product that would legitimise their use. In practice though, this effort may actually only further stigmatise 
the weapon.
An important element in ensuring this outcome will be the ongoing work of States Parties and civil society to monitor
practices by States Parties and states not party alike in relation to the provisions of the treaty. This monitoring and
reporting function, both through formal and informal mechanisms, will play an important role in developing the stigma
against these weapons. A treaty in clear terms will provide the best basis for that ongoing monitoring process.
Likewise, those several states within the Oslo Process but expressing significant reservations about its scope and
terms face the prospect of being constrained in their practices whether they are formally signed up to the resulting
convention or not.
In contrast, the several dozens of countries currently part of the Oslo Process and voicing their active commitment 
to securing a comprehensive prohibition have the chance to establish important humanitarian standards for the
international community. This is a historical opportunity that should not be lost.
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Throughout recorded history, concerns have been raised
about the acceptability of certain means and methods 
of warfare. For example, and with differing degrees of
success, attempts have been made in the past to single
out crossbows, firearms, poisons and other weapons as
deplorable and unfit for use.3 In modern times, much of
the state-level discussion about the appropriateness of
specific weapons relates to their perceived
permissibility under international humanitarian law
(IHL). As stated in Article 35(1) of 1977 First Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949:
In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to 
the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare
is not unlimited.
In the recent past, certain weapons deemed to cause
“unnecessary suffering,” “superfluous injury” or
“indiscriminate effects” have been prohibited or
regulated by States Parties to the UN Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).4
While it has been over 30 years since concerns
regarding the humanitarian consequences of cluster
munition use were first cited in formal international
discussions as grounds for these weapons being
subject to some form of prohibition5, as yet, no specific
international controls have been introduced for this
category of weapons. This is likely soon to change as a
result of the ongoing Oslo Process. This process is
based on the 2007 Oslo Declaration which called for
states to conclude by the end of 2008 a legally binding
prohibition on the use, stockpiling, production and
transfer of cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable
harm to civilians.” 
During the conferences of the Oslo Process, various
questions have been asked of how best to achieve this
aim. In particular, the extent to which major user,
stockpiler, and producer nations need to sign up to the
formal convention as finally agreed has been said by
some to be a crucial factor in ensuring its humanitarian
benefit. To this end, some states have argued that the
Convention text should be weakened so as to make it
more likely that states either not currently taking part 
in the process or within the process but expressing
substantial reservations will eventually sign.
‘Weakened’ in this context means that the prohibition
would apply to a narrower range of weapon systems, 
it would be applied with less urgency, and the rules
would be more tolerant of the use of cluster munitions
by states not party to the treaty.
History, however, would suggest caution regarding 
such an approach. Instead, past attempts to limit the
methods and means of warfare illustrate that treaties
and conventions can play a wider ethical standard
setting function within the international community.
Prohibition agreements have had relevance far beyond
their formal terms and official signatories. The
stigmatization of certain categories of weapons and
methods of attack has been a very important outcome 
of past deliberations and international treaties.
In order to substantiate these claims about the past
importance and future potential of stigma, this report
examines lessons from a number of cases of weapons
prohibitions; including those for landmines, chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons. The next section
begins though by providing a background to the specific
context of this report: the ongoing Oslo Process. 
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Introduction
The Oslo Process has established a commitment by a
majority of countries in the world to agree a prohibition
on a type of weapon long singled out for its problematic
humanitarian consequences. The first conference as
part of this process took place in Oslo, Norway, in
February 2007. This conference produced the Oslo
Declaration that was endorsed by 46 of the 49 countries
participating in the meeting. The Oslo Declaration
included a commitment that states would:
1. Conclude by 2008 a legally binding international
instrument that will: 
i. prohibit the use, production, transfer and
stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause
unacceptable harm to civilians, and 
ii. establish a framework for cooperation and
assistance that ensures adequate provision of
care and rehabilitation to survivors and their
communities, clearance of contaminated areas,
risk education and destruction of stockpiles of
prohibited cluster munitions. 
Subsequently, conferences in Lima, Peru (23–25 May
2007) and in Vienna, Austria (4–7 December 2007)
produced a draft treaty text. The most recent conference
in Wellington, New Zealand involved some 100
countries. By 28 April 2008, 92 countries had aligned
themselves with the ‘Declaration of the Wellington
Conference on Cluster Munitions’ that reaffirmed the
central tenets of the Oslo Declaration and provided a
commitment to undertake final negotiations of a treaty
in Dublin in May 2008 on the basis of the strong draft
convention circulated prior to Wellington.
Throughout this process, questions have been voiced
about how the humanitarian goal underpinning the
shared pledge to prohibit cluster munitions that cause
unacceptable harm to civilians can be best realized. 
At the Wellington Conference, for example, issues
regarding possible ‘transition periods’ for continued 
use of the banned weapons, ‘interoperability,’ and
‘inclusiveness’ were topics of significant contention in
the plenary and in informal consultations. For each,
concerns have been raised about the current treaty text
as summarised below. Concerns about the definition of
cluster munitions and possible exceptions from the ban
are dealt with later in this paper.
1. Transition Period: A number of states taking part in the
Oslo Process stockpile weapons that may well fall foul
of the eventual definition of a cluster munition to be
prohibited under the treaty. The notion of a transition
period between the agreement of the convention and
the actual prohibition of cluster munition use has
been proposed as one way of allowing states to
procure alternative force options. Germany has been
very active on this topic, issuing a Discussion Paper 
at the Wellington Conference that made the case for 
a step-by-step approach.6 That approach would entail
first the immediate prohibition of “unreliable” and
“inaccurate” cluster munitions that cause hazardous
effects “equal to anti-personnel mines.” Remaining
types defined as “reliable” and “accurate” or
equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation
systems would then be phased out over a specified
number of years. During interventions at the
Wellington Conference, Germany elaborated the
humanitarian justification for a transition period 
as a “real world” solution to some governments’
reliance on current stockpiles. In enabling those states
to immediately accede to a new treaty while placing
demands on them to phase out all cluster munitions
as defined by the treaty, Germany has argued that the
scope for the use of such weapons in combat would
be less than if such states only signed the treaty when
they were prepared for an immediate withdrawal of
prohibited weapons from service. It is of course
important to note that those states advocating a
transition period for certain cluster munitions are
effectively agreeing that they cause unacceptable
harm and should be banned.  
2. Interoperability: A number of countries have
expressed concerns that the treaty text might
hamper their ability to conduct military activities
with those nations that do not become signatories
to the prohibition.7 The United Kingdom, for
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example, argued the current text “renders coalition
and multinational operations, including UN chapter
VII, NATO, EU operations, difficult or even untenable
with those members of the coalition who are not
states parties to the convention and deploy those
types of cluster munition that could be prohibited
under this treaty.”8 Canada likewise spoke to these
concerns stating: “It would be no exaggeration to
say that our ability to support a new Convention 
will depend on whether or not we can address the
interoperability issue in a manner that ensures the
continued viability of combined operations with
non-party states.”9 The implication follows that
without sufficient modification to the existing treaty
text, some states will not be able to support it. 
To enable them to sign the convention, certain
countries have called for a modification of Article
1(c) that requires a State Party not to: “Assist,
encourage or induce anyone to engage in any
activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Convention.” This might be done, for instance, 
by introducing qualifying language regarding the
meaning of assistance of the kind that did not
appear in the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.10
3. Inclusivity: Concerns have been expressed by a
number of states that an international instrument 
for the prohibition of a weapon is taking place
outside the CCW. In line with these arguments, 
some countries have expressed reservations about
the Oslo Process in relation to the participation of
certain major user and stockpiling nations. Japan, 
for instance, intervened more than once during the
Wellington Conference to argue for the need to make
sure such states become signatories to any eventual
convention. To achieve this, it has been proposed
that compromise treaty language is needed.
Proponents argue that this language needs to strike
a balance between humanitarian and military
considerations – by which they mean greater weight
should be given to the military considerations than
they perceive to be the case at present. To this end,
Japan tabled numerous proposed changes to the
treaty text to introduce exemptions and
qualifications.11 A common conclusion from such
arguments is that the definition of what is
prohibited should be narrow rather than broad,
allowing the continued use of greater number of
existing weapon systems.
States raising these issues of possible ‘transition
periods,’ of ‘interoperability,’ and inclusiveness offer
justifications and positions that vary in significant ways.
However, they all seem to share the underpinning
premise that the eventual convention will provide
benefit from a humanitarian perspective only to the
extent that states — including certain apparently “more
significant” ones — become signatories to the specific
wording agreed. 
The upshot of this is to call for changes to the current
treaty text that would place less restrictive obligations
on states, that would not apply to all cluster munitions
as defined and that would come into force with less
urgency. From a perspective that prioritises
humanitarian protection, all of these proposed changes
can be considered as weakening the current text. 
The treaty will be formally negotiated at the Dublin
Conference between 19–30 May 2008. The details of
those negotiations and the eventual agreed text will
have far-reaching implications for what the original
commitment to prohibit “cluster munitions that cause
unacceptable harm to civilians” means in practice.
Whilst the strength of the norm produced by these
deliberations will depend on many factors, the historical
record suggests that the strength of the formal text will
be critical to the stigmatization of cluster munitions and
reform of practice.
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The remainder of this report examines and takes issue
with the premise noted in the previous section as
underpinning many of the calls for a weakening of the
existing Draft Cluster Munition Convention text. That
premise is that conventions and treaties matter from a
humanitarian perspective only to the extent that states
become signatories to the specific text agreed. By
contrast, this report argues that many past conventions
have had repercussions:
a) on states beyond those officially declared as States
Parties;  
b) on practices beyond the formal restrictions imposed
through their text. 
The manner in which these further implications have
been realized speaks to how standards for conduct are
set in the international community. Instead of those
standards simply deriving from voluntary state
adherence to the legal terms of treaties and conventions,
the conduct of states can be influenced through the
establishment of norms for acceptable behaviour.
The importance of norms in the actions of states has
been a subject of much discussion in recent years far
beyond matters of disarmament and non-proliferation
agreements. As part of what is often characterized as a
sociological turn in the study of international affairs, the
reasons behind state actions have been sought beyond
a narrow conception of national interests or power.12 As
has been argued, for example, the growing prominence
of multilateral humanitarian interventions confounds
many of the traditional principles that are held to shape
state behaviour.13 As well, it has been contended that
relying on a narrow sense of national interests cannot
explain the pattern of weapons procurement in many
developing countries. These states acquire high-tech
weaponry not necessarily because of strategic
calculations, but because of identity considerations
about what it means to be a modern state.14 
As part of this moving beyond narrow conceptions of
power and interest, the case has been made for the role
of norms in behaviour. Norms can be thought of as
shared standards of right and wrong that influence
behaviour by generating expectations for appropriate
conduct.15 They offer individuals a sense of “who they
are and what they can do in given situations.”16 The
examples that follow highlight the varying role of 
norms and related stigmas in past humanitarian
treaties. Later sections then consider what the 
lessons from these cases counsel for the current
juncture of the Oslo Process. 
Case : anti-personnel landmines
The “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction” (or “APM Ban
Convention”) illustrates how a treaty can affect the actions
of those states not formally declared State Parties.
Of all the examples of existing humanitarian treaties, the
Oslo Process towards a prohibition on cluster munitions is
most often likened to that undertaken for anti-personnel
mines (APMs) a decade ago. The weapons are often seen
as presenting a similar profile of humanitarian problems –
including post-conflict civilian death and injury and
deleterious effects on local communities. The Oslo
Process shares with the Ottawa Process a collaborative
engagement between states and members of international
civil society.17 Also, both processes were born out of the
failure of the CCW18 to take sufficient action as perceived
by many states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and inter-governmental organizations.19
The 1997 APM Ban Convention prohibits the use,
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and
transfer of all anti-personnel mines as defined in the
treaty text. As opposed to Protocol II and Amended
Protocol II of the CCW with respect to mines, the APM 
Ban Convention embodies a comprehensive prohibition,
albeit on the more limited category of APMs within the
larger category of ‘landmines.’ As of April 2008, there are
155 States Parties to the treaty. Despite this widespread
uptake, major military powers such as the USA, Russia,
China, India, and Pakistan remain outside. Instead, these
governments argue that AP mines remain necessary,
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The prohibition of weapons 
militarily effective and discriminate in their effects if the
right precautions regarding their placement, marking and
removal are taken. This lack of universal inclusion might
be taken as representing a major deficiency of the APM
Ban Convention.
However, as various analysts have argued,20 such 
an evaluation would ignore the contribution of the
Convention in setting international standards. As 
Herby and Lawand have stated: 
[M]ost of the […] states that are not party to the
Treaty are in practice respecting its prohibitions 
on their transfer, production and use.  This can be
attributed to the stigmatization of these weapons in
the eyes of the public. In the increasingly rare cases
where some of these states have used antipersonnel
mines, reaction has been swift and vigorous,
spearheaded by the ICBL (International Campaign 
to Born Landmines).21 
It is important to note, in this example, that the
subsequent effectiveness of the treaty is attributed 
in part to the ongoing monitoring function played by
civil society. Such monitoring provides a critical further
strengthening of the normative function of the treaty. 
If the terms of the treaty are clear, such a mechanism
provides a practical basis for identifying (or
establishing) ‘transgressions’ by States Parties and
states not party alike.
The wider stigmatization of anti-personnel mines was
further illustrated with the following considerations:
■ Many of the states not formally signed up to the APM
Ban Convention have nonetheless agreed through
their statements, agreements, and declarations to
work towards the ultimate elimination of APMs. The
consensus text from the Second Review Conference of
the CCW wherein states affirmed ‘... their conviction
that all States should strive towards the goal of the
eventual elimination of antipersonnel mines
globally”22 is one such instance;
■ The conduct of some of those states not party to the
APM Ban Convention has been in line with its terms.
According to Herby and Lawand, the US, for
instance, “has not used antipersonnel mines since
1991, exported them since 1992, or produced them
since 1997;”
■ Non-signatory nations such as Sri Lanka and
Morocco have reported under the transparency
provisions of Article 7 of the APM Convention;
■ The export and shipment of APMs has been reduced
dramatically, with 13 states not signed up to the
Convention having initiated moratoria on their trade.  
In addition, it would be possible to cite how once major
producers no longer engage in such production.23 Herby
and Lawand posit that one reason for this pattern of
behaviour is that non-signatory states “need to be seen
and accepted as members in good standing of the
international community.”
Of course, whatever the extent of uniformity in certain
areas of conduct, diversity among states remains. Any
prohibition has boundaries on its scope that lead to
disagreements about appropriate action. What
distinguishes anti-personnel mines from anti-tank mines
remains contentious.24 The role of technical modifications,
such as ‘anti-handling devices’ is another such topic.
Furthermore, the US has sought to develop technical
solutions to the problems of landmines by actively
promoting new ‘smart’ self-destructing and non-lethal
mines,25 a policy reaffirmed in February 2004 by the 
Bush Administration. The APM Ban Convention makes 
no allowances for potential ‘humane’ or appropriate uses 
of anti-personnel landmines in particular situations; it
simply deems these weapons unlawful. The attempt is
being made by the US to differentiate the general category
of ‘landmines’ into sub-categories such as ‘smart’ versus
‘persistent’ or ‘long-lived’ mines. NGOs have argued that
use of so-called ‘smart’ mines would not result in affected
communities feeling safer after conflict, would hamper
demining efforts, and undermine the comprehensive
prohibition of anti-personnel mines.26
Such areas of contention serve to emphasise that 
norms are not simply standards set once and for all, 
but are actively negotiated over time. What is
stigmatized as unacceptable can transform in response
to technological and political developments. Looking 
to the future, Herby and Lawand proposed the current
norm on APMs could be eroded either through
a) states treating it as optional in light of its non-
universal status or
b) inconsistent practices in relation to the boundaries
and terms of the Convention threatening its
integrity.
In light of this, they recommend continuing vigilance in
the policing of the Convention. 
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Case: chemical weapons
The history of attempts to prohibit chemical weapons
illustrates how deliberations, declarations, and
treaties can have implications beyond the formal
restrictions agreed.  
With a much longer history than APMs, the case of
chemical weapons provides an important example of
how categories of weapons can became stigmatized to
such an extent that few even contemplate them as
appropriate means of force. Despite the existence of
offensive programmes by certain states participating in
major conflicts during the 20th century – for example,
in Korea, Europe and South East Asia – the use of these
weapons has been quite limited. Typically, when use
has taken place, then controversy has followed. Today,
no state in the world declares itself to have an offensive
chemical weapons programme. 
In part, this stigma has stemmed from the long running
identification of chemical weapons with poisons.
Indeed, the historically constrained and often
contentious use of poisons in conflict is perhaps the
most powerful example how the means of warfare have
not been unlimited in practice. The likelihood of death
and the potential for indiscriminate casualties have
been central justifications for the abhorrence of poisons
for many centuries. 
In the modern period of nation states, the formal
prohibition of chemical weapons can be traced back to
the Hague Conference of 1899. There, under Declaration
II, the Contracting Powers agreed to, “abstain from the
use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”
Declaration II was not abided by during World War I.
After the first use of chlorine gas in warfare by the
Germans at Ypres in Belgium, persistent, lethal, and
harassing chemical agents were deployed on a wide
scale. Yet such weapons were treated as problematic at
the time. Germany originally attempted to justify its use
of chlorine through arguing it was not in violation of
Declaration II because ‘cylinder dispensers’ rather than
‘projectiles’ were employed.27 More significantly
perhaps, within the militaries of Western Europe
disagreement was voiced about the appropriateness of
chemical weapons, in part, because of their perceived
indiscriminate effects. Among the many new means of
killing developed during WWI, chemical weapons were
set apart from many of the other means by much of the
population of Europe.28
After the war this differentiation continued. Both
opponents and proponents of chemical warfare
contended it was distinctive and particularly powerful.29
Opponents portrayed this weaponry as inhumane in
large part because of its supposedly indiscriminate
effects. Proponents portrayed it as both enabling fewer
causalities in war as well as being a class of equipment
so destructive it could ensure complete victory (and
thus had very high military utility.) The extent of funding
of chemical weapons-related research and development
during and after WWI in turn led to developments in
bomber aircraft, pesticides and herbicides, and tear 
gas – all of which in turn facilitated the possible further
development of chemical weapons.30
At an international level of diplomacy, deliberations 
about the appropriateness of these weapons took place 
in forums such as the Paris Peace Conference and the
Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922. With the
signing of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (or ‘Geneva Protocol’),
those demanding additional constraints secured what in
essence amounted to a ‘no-first-use’ pact. 
Although the international agreements reached were
significant at the time, the nature and extent of the
stigma against this class of weaponry was also open 
to doubt. Who chemical weapons could be used against
was one topic of controversy. The Hague Declaration
was not applied to non-Contracting Powers and
countries such as the UK and France added a similar
stipulation to their support for the Geneva Protocol. In
effect, these qualifications introduced a split between
those nations it was acceptable to subject to chemical
attack and those it was not. In addition, use against
signatories to the Geneva Protocol was not always
condemned. When Italian forces used chemical
weapons against Ethiopia during 1935–36,31 only
muted international condemnation followed. 
Despite these considerations, with the exception of
Japan in China, restraint with chemical weapons was
widely evident in World War II. Even more than this,
offensive capabilities were neglected and offensive 
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preparations limited in many countries. For example,
the UK made chemical defensive preparations only
shortly before war and had only limited capabilities
during it. In only two instances – the use of mustard 
gas in the case of German invasion or as a retaliation 
for V-rocket bombings – did the British government
seriously plan for the use of chemical weapons.32
As Richard Price has argued, the repeated reinforcement
of the stigma against them through international
deliberations and public anxiety played an important
role in shaping perceptions about their utility and
acceptability within militaries and governments during
WWII.33 It was not simply the case that the history of
past prohibitions was irrelevant because they were
violated or weak because they were subject to
qualification. Rather, over time the repeated portrayal of
chemical weapons as abhorrent had wide ranging
consequences for how their ultimate utility was
conceived (e.g., in terms of their deterrence role or fit
within existing military culture.)34
It is notable that in the near total war situation that
characterized WWII, chemical weapons were identified
even then as distinct. Much of this was tied up with the
international identity of states and what it meant to be 
a ‘civilised’ nation. In 1943, US President Roosevelt
famously said of chemical weapons that “use of such
weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of
civilized mankind.”35
This orientation of ‘categorically unacceptable for a
modern state’ became increasingly widespread after
WWII, though again subject to negotiation.36 For
instance, it was not until the mid-1970s that the US
ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol, when it was accused
of violating the international customary norm set by 
the Protocol because of US use of gas, napalm and
herbicides in Vietnam.37 However, the US government
had also argued that these chemicals were outside 
the scope of the Protocol. This claim was made despite
initial agreements in the 1930s that agents such as 
tear gas and herbicides were included within its scope.38
American officials also argued that such weapons might
provide a more humane option in certain settings.39
When the US did ratify the Geneva Protocol in 
1975, this was done with various provisos enabling
harassing agents such as CS to be used in defensive
military actions.
At the start of the 21st century, through their actions
and statements, many governments have reinforced
long-standing claims that chemical weapons are
abhorrent and unacceptable. The 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) places a wide-ranging
prohibition on these weapons among its 183 Member
States. That some countries might use, proliferate,
possess or be suspected of possessing such weapons
can (at least on some occasions) lead to a significant
response in the international community. For example,
that the Iraqi military employed chemical weapons to
kill over 5,000 Iraqi Kurds in Halabja and elsewhere
during 1988 was widely cited in the lead up to the 2003
Iraq war as an indicator the problematic nature of
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Through such arguments,
chemical weapons have been placed in an especially
repugnant moral category.40
The near universal status of the CWC and the taboo
against chemical weapons has not completely ended
controversy about the exact scope of the prohibition.
For example, under an exemption provided in the CWC
for the use of chemicals in “law enforcement”, some
armed forces (for instance, in the US and Russia) are
actively pursuing so-called incapacitating chemical
agents for riot control. Some believe this exemption
could well undermine attempts to stigmatize and
eliminate chemical weapons per se.41
Case: biological weapons
The moral repugnance generally associated with
biological weapons illustrates how restraints are
exercised beyond the terms of the formal prohibitions
and how those formal prohibitions can affect states not
party to them.  
The stigma of biological weapons shares much of the
history and many of the dynamics associated with
chemical weapons. 
In past centuries and certainly during the 20th century,
unease has been expressed from many quarters about
deliberately spreading disease as a means of warfare.
Those seeking to justify why these weapons should be
deemed more morally repugnant than ‘conventional’
weapons that kill and maim have done so by arguing 
(as with chemical weapons) that their effects are
particularly severe, their development perverts the
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goals of medicine/science, they are likely to be
devastating to civilian populations, and that ‘the public’
has a deep psychological aversion to them.
And yet, running alongside such condemnations, it is
possible to identify instances of the use of what would
be today be identified as biological weapons. During
the siege of Kaffa, Tartars loaded the bodies of plague
victims on catapults and threw them over the city walls.
In the 18th century, Sir Jeffrey Amherst ordered British
General Henry Bouquet to disseminate smallpox among
tribes in the Ohio-Pennsylvania region using blankets of
ill soldiers. During the American Civil War in the 19th
century, Confederate soldiers poisoned wells with the
carcasses of animals that had died of infectious
diseases. It is also possible to identify state-based
justifications for biological warfare programmes in the
20th century – including that research into biological
weapons produced relatively humane weapons.42
Such considerations suggest the constraints against
biological warfare have never been absolute. As with
chemical weapons, the long history of efforts to render
biological weapons taboo has not been one of reference
to objective and persevering criteria about what counts
as inherently unacceptable. Rather such an evaluation
has had to be repeatedly negotiated in response to
changing situations.43
And yet, despite the existence of offensive state
programmes by major powers during the 20th century,
the use and even preparation for biological warfare was
limited overall.44 During World War I, for instance, only
Germany undertook serious steps to utilize the
emerging scientific understanding of infectious disease
for destructive ends for example. it made efforts to
infect draft animals with glanders and anthrax. During
World War II, few countries even made active
preparations for deploying biological weapons. Outside
of the Japanese in China, biological weapons were not
used in World War II in any significant way. It was only
after this war that major state offensive preparations
began in earnest. Since then though, there have only
been a few instances of alleged biowarfare.45
Again as with chemical weapons, it is possible to argue
that perceptions of the moral acceptability of biological
weapons were not wholly separate from perceptions of
their military utility. Rather, emerging norms about the
status of these weapons affected the extent and nature
of funding of offensive programmes, calculations of 
the likely military retaliations and political ramifications
that would result from their use, and the willingness 
of military commanders to incorporate them within 
their arsenals.46
Also, as again with chemical weapons, despite attempts
to promote biological weapons as an acceptable option
by certain proponents, the 20th century witnessed the
agreement of a categorical international prohibition.
Article I of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) mandates that:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
never in any circumstances to develop, produce 
or stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of
types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. 
The Preamble to the BTWC reads that the weaponisation
of biological agents would be “repugnant to the
conscience of mankind and that no effort should be
spared” to minimize the possibility of this taking place. 
As another parallel with chemical weapons, not all
states have adhered to either the emerging norm
against these weapons or their official treaty
commitments. Despite being one of three depositors 
for the BTWC, the USSR continued (and indeed,
massively expanded) its offensive biological weapons
programme until the early 1990s. And yet despite such
major infractions, today no state in the world claims to
operate such a program. Within diplomatic and military
circles, little credence is given to the suggestion that
the category of biological weapons should not be
treated as distinct and prohibited.47 In short, they 
are taboo. As with the case of chemical weapons in the
build up to the 2003 Iraq War, allegations made about
Iraq’s possession of biological weapons were part of
justifications for placing its government outside of the
international community.48
As is often the case with formal prohibitions, the
boundary between what is permissible and what is not
is a matter of uncertainty and contention with regard to
the BTWC. The open-ended nature of Article I is at once
both the Convention’s strength and its weakness. It has
the strength of being flexible enough to accommodate
12 a convention beyond the convention: stigma, humanitarian standards and the oslo process
new technologies and it does not seek to limit the use
of biological agents for benign purposes. However, it
also has the major weakness of failing to elaborate just
what is and is not permissible.49 The BTWC draws on a
number of terms such as ‘development’, ‘acquire’,
‘prophylactic’ and ‘protective.’ The meaning of these 
as they relate to determinations of the permissibility 
of particular activities (such as the permissibility of
biodefense programmes50) has been a matter of
considerable contention since the inception of the
Convention.  The lack of verification procedures in BTWC
and an implementation organisation comparable to the
International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has further
weakened this convention.
Case: nuclear weapons
The history of debate about nuclear weapons illustrates
how a taboo can develop for the use of certain means 
of force that goes beyond any treaty restrictions agreed.
It also illustrates the precarious standing of a
stigmatization when the bounds of what should 
be prohibited are not comprehensive.
Today, nuclear weapons are widely considered to
constitute a special class of weaponry whose
appropriateness is not simply a function of kiloton
explosive power.51 They are not just ‘big bombs’ in 
the arsenals of certain states that may be suitable 
when significant firepower is called for. Instead, they
are deemed distinctive and perhaps archetypal
unconventional weapons. 
As with the other cases mentioned in this report,
however, this status has developed over time. Take the
developing attitude to nuclear weapons in the US
military and government, for example. As Tannenwald52
has argued, with the Allied fire-bombing of cities in
Japan and Germany during WWII, the use of atomic
bombs was not generally held by top US officials and
commanders to represent a discontinuity from then
existing practices. US Secretary of War Henry Stimson,
for instance, commented that atomic bombs were 
“as legitimate as any other of the deadly explosive
weapons.”53 With the Korean War and the development
of thermonuclear capabilities, however, this
assessment was increasingly questioned within
government circles and many sectors of the American
public. Despite his initial decision to bomb Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, President Truman later contended to his
senior policy makers that “you’ve got to understand
that this isn’t a military weapon...It is used to wipe out
women and children and unarmed people, and not for
military uses. So we have got to treat it differently from
rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that.”54
As Farrell and Lambert argue, the need for a distinction
between weapon types was not confined to politicians
or members of the public. One could find traces of it in
military forces, though the standing accorded to nuclear
weapons has always been interlaced with institutional
politics. So shortly after World War II:
Navy leaders also opposed counter-city targeting,
ostensibly on moral and strategic grounds, but
really to deflect budget cuts. In the “Revolt of the
Admirals” in late 1949, senior Navy leaders publicly
denounced nuclear attacks on cities as barbaric. A
decade later, they strongly advocated the targeting
of Soviet cities because the Navy was acquiring a
highly inaccurate submarine-based nuclear
weapons system that could hit little else.55
While President Eisenhower fought against efforts 
to set nuclear weapons apart from other force options, 
a general repugnance was building in the public
consciousness/conscience in the 1950s.56 
Tannenwald maintains that by the time of the Vietnam
War little serious attention was given to the use of
nuclear weapons by senior politicians. Although the
targeting of Soviet cities remained in place throughout
the Cold War and some military officials pressed for
their limited use, nuclear weapons gradually became
further and further designated as distinct options57
that could only be justified as retaliatory measures in
extreme situations. The use of these weapons became
seen as incompatible with the identity that US leaders
wished to foster about the US within the international
community. While the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty did not compel nuclear states (such as the US) 
to give up their arsenals immediately, by limiting their
further transfer and proliferation it did underscore the
international concern about the basic acceptability of
these weapons. 
The importance of stigma and identity factors is
suggested by a couple of considerations. One, efforts 
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in the US and elsewhere to develop so-called ‘low
yield’58 nuclear weapons for battlefield encounters have
yet to produce options deemed usable in practice. Even
though some of these weapons could result in damage
comparable to certain conventional explosive devices,
they were and remain treated as distinct because of
their designation as ‘nuclear.’ Two, limits and
constraints evident in the practice of states cannot be
accounted for by appeals to traditional balance of force
explanations. So while it would have been possible for
the US to utilise lower yield nuclear weapons during
certain encounters in the 1991 Gulf War without fear 
of like for like retaliation, it did not do so.
Today an extensive range of treaties and agreements
pertain to the general scope for the use of nuclear
weapons. And yet, the taboo with regard to them is
often limited to their use rather than ‘mere’ possession
or development. States with or seeking to acquire such
weapons do not portray them as abhorrent per se in the
same way chemical or biological weapons are deemed
as wholly abhorrent today. 
Given the choice of certain states to retain nuclear
weapons, the taboo associated with them is arguably
up for negotiation today to an extent not so for some 
of the other weapons highlighted in this report.
Historically, the situation today with nuclear weapons 
is comparable to the standing given to chemical and
biological weapons after the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 
In December 1994, the UN General Assembly requested
that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) offer an
advisory opinion on the question “is the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted
under international law?”59 The ruling represented the
first time such a major tribunal directly addressed the
dangers and thereby the legality of nuclear weapons. 
In relation to the themes of this report, what is of note
from the proceedings of the ICJ is the manner in which
certain nations argued for the permissibility of the use
of nuclear weapons – and thus undercut the character
of a taboo. The UK was one that argued against treating
nuclear weapons per se as incompatible with the
principles of humanitarian law in suggesting: 
The reality . . . is that nuclear weapons might be
used in a wide variety of circumstances with very
different results in terms of likely civilian casualties.
In some cases, such as the use of a low yield
nuclear weapon against warships on the High Seas
or troops in sparsely populated areas, it is possible
to envisage a nuclear attack which caused
comparatively few civilian casualties. It is by no
means the case that every use of nuclear weapons
against a military objective would inevitably cause
very great collateral civilian casualties.60
As expressed here, the acceptability of nuclear 
weapons depends on a weighing of circumstantial and
consequential considerations.61 Yet, the same weighing
approach would not be taken by the British in relation
to, say, the use of sarin gas or botulinum toxin despite
the same underlying logic applying. 
The ICJ decision can be interpreted as exhibiting
tensions associated with at once regarding nuclear
weapons as categorically suspect while also desiring 
to allow their use. The judges agreed that the existing
rules of international law neither universally prohibited
nor authorized the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 
As with other weapons, it was agreed that the use of
nuclear weapons had to comply with the tenets of
international law. To the central issue of permissibility
though, by a vote of seven to seven decided through 
the second vote of the President of the Court, the
judges ruled that: 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law; 
However, in view of the current state of international
law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the
Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful
in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which
the very survival of a State would be at stake.
So while the threat or use of nuclear weapons was
generally held to be against international law, the judges
could not determine that it would always be unlawful.
Just what would constitute “the very survival of a State
would be at stake” was not defined in the ICJ opinion. 
In reaching this judgment that use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons is generally, but perhaps not always,
contrary to international law, the ICJ judges followed 
an ambiguous approach. These weapons had “unique
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characteristics” in relation to their “destructive
capacity, their capacity to cause untold human
suffering, and their ability to cause damage to
generations to come”62 but still they had to be subject 
to similar contingent and contextual restrictions that
apply to other weapons.63 Responding to the claims
forwarded by the UK and others regarding the relative
acceptability of certain nuclear weapons in a limited
range of hypothetical situations, the judges ruled that
while the use of nuclear weapons seemed “scarcely
reconcilable” with respect for international law they
could not “conclude with certainty that the use of
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with
the principles and rules of law applicable in armed
conflict in any circumstance.”64
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The first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
prescribes that the right of states to choose the
methods and means of warfare is not unlimited. In 
line with this, the previous section substantiated how,
through their practices, states have not regarded their
choices in weaponry as unlimited and it highlighted 
that such limitations have often been above and beyond
what states have agreed to as part of formal
international treaties. Table I (above, page 16–17)
summarises many of the points made in the previous
section with regard to the four types of weapons
surveyed; including the relevant formal agreements and
the importance of social conventions and moral norms.
The limitations observed in the practice of states in
relation to armed conflict do not relate only to marginal
force options of little possible utility. Indeed, across a
range of particularly powerful weapon technologies –
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, often
referred to as ‘weapons of mass destruction’ – it is
possible to identify how state practices have been
curtailed well beyond formally agreed limits. 
Crucial to understanding the importance of norms and
stigmas is their relation to conceptions of state identity.
When the possession and use of certain weapons is
seen as incompatible with the identity a country wishes
to foster in the international community, then that
assessment can contribute to restrained conduct in
warfare. Moreover, concerns about identity can affect
the calculations made in times of peace regarding the
gains and drawbacks associated with pursing the
development of particular force options. As in the case
of chemical and biological warfare capabilities in the
build up to WWII, the stigma against certain categories
can affect whether they are judged as compatible with
‘military culture.’ A perceived lack of such a fit can affect
what resources militaries dedicate to these options and,
in turn, their ultimate utility. In such ways, norms and
interests are not mutually exclusive. Instead, norms
“enter into, and change, the cost-benefit calculations 
of interests [...] but they also help to constitute those
interests, identities and practices in the first place.
Interests and international norms may coincide, but this
coincidence does not render norms superfluous.”65
The two most basic elements in the development of
norms and stigmas regarding weapons include:
1. Singling out certain weapons or classes of weapon
from the rest, and
2. Having some basis for treating them as exceptional
and requiring special consideration.
The singling out of a weapon is a first step in
differentiating them from other means of force that
result in death and injury.  Past and current debate
about whether weapons such as napalm, incendiary
devices, ‘riot control’ agents, anti-plant chemicals,
lachrymators agents (e.g. tear gas), and even smoke
count as ‘chemical weapons’ illustrates the scope for
disagreement and re-interpretation. Such questioning
can undermine the possibility for establishing
international normative standards. Further to this,
without demands that a class of weapon be considered
both distinct and exceptional, recognition as a distinct
category might not translate into changes in practice. 
Box 1 provides a comparison between the fate of two
categories of weapons to underscore the contingencies
and choices associated with how standards are
established and negotiated. 
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Chemical weapons
While chemical weapons have long been treated as suspect and have fairly recently been subjected to the wide ranging
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), just what ought to properly fall within this category has been subject to debate
over time. How weapons associated with ‘riot control’ should be labelled has been one such area of controversy.  
The 1993 CWC prohibits the development, production, or retention of weapons that through their “chemical action on
life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals.” The CWC does,
however, permit the use of agents for law enforcement purposes including domestic riot control. This provision has
enabled the continuing use of tear gas and similar options by police forces around the world. 
Yet the meaning of key terms (such as ‘riot control agent’ and ‘law enforcement’) pertinent in establishing exactly what 
is prohibited by the CWC were deliberately left ambiguous in its negotiation in order to reach a compromise text.66 For
instance, the US has insisted on its right to use riot control agents in what it refers to as ‘military operations other than
war’ (such as peacekeeping missions) and to use such agents during particular situations in areas of conflict (for example,
during prison riots in occupied territory). In large part because of the ambiguity of key terms of the CWC, opposing legal
opinions exist about the permissibility of ‘riot control agents’ in circumstances that move between peacekeeping and
active war-fighting. So while the category of chemical weapons is prohibited and widely stigmatized, just what makes for 
a chemical weapon and when exactly an exemption for their use might apply are subject to different interpretations.  
The scope of exemptions made with regard to riot  control agents is currently a matter of significant policy attention
because of two sets of developments: 1) the increasing blurring of war-fighting and policing roles by militaries in recent
interventions, and 2) the interest of some states in developing novel chemical agents for situations outside of warfare.
The use of a fentanyl derivative in the October 2002 Moscow theater siege which left nearly 130 people dead illustrates
how pharmaceutical agents are being developed and held as part of state arsenals. While previous ‘incapacitating
agents’ (such as CS and CN) had effects that lasted a short time after exposure, countries including Russia and the US
have been pursuing work in relation to what are referred to as ‘non-lethal’ pharmacological sedatives and calmatives
(such as anaesthetic agents, antidepressants, and antipsychotics). These sit in the mid-spectrum between chemical and
biological weapons. Generally, these biochemical agents target the central nervous systems and have effects that last
well beyond the time of exposure.67
Concern has been expressed that both sets of developments could lead to the deterioration of the much worked for
stigma against ‘chemical weapons’ and thereby, that against poisons in conflict. The British Medical Association, for
instance, recently stated that it is “fundamentally opposed to the use of any pharmaceutical agent as a weapon,” in 
part because of fears this “could lead to weakening of the CWC and BTWC.”68
Explosive weapons
In contrast to the use of poisons and toxins, the use of explosive weapons as a category is not subject to specific
prohibition instruments or necessarily even recognised as a distinct category of weapons in formal instruments.
Explosive weapons include artillery shells, bombs, grenades, mortars and rockets all of which project blast and/ or
fragmentation out from a point of detonation.
No formal instruments currently group all explosive weapons together and treat them as a distinct category of weapons
in need of particular consideration. And yet in practice there are ways in which explosive weapons are treated as distinct
that could serve as the basis for a widely recognised categorical evaluation. The basis for this is implicit in the manner 
in which they are traditionally the tools of the military for the purpose of war-fighting and are not considered acceptable
for domestic policing. Significantly also a robust hypothesis can be made that, in general, explosive weapons (even
relatively small explosive weapons) are not considered necessary or appropriate for use amongst citizen populations 
to whom the users are directly accountable.69
Such limitations in the practice of many countries suggest that these weapons are only considered appropriate under
certain types of conditions. It would have been possible in the past for such practices to be codified and reinforced
through international treaties associated with the category of ‘explosive weapons.’ This, however, has not taken place.
As with traditional and novel ‘riot control’ agents, the increasing blurring of war-fighting and policing roles in recent
conflicts raises the question of how the long standing but little noted differential treatment of explosive violence as a
particular means of armed violence will fare in the future.
Box 1: Contrasting categories and standards
Making norms matter
For all of the potential importance of norms for
constraining or conditioning action, they do not
determine practices in a straightforward manner. What it
means to adhere to a norm, like what counts as following
a rule, is always at some level to be worked out through
negotiation and practice. Formalised standards cannot
set out once and for all what is acceptable in practice in
every circumstance. Furthermore, different norms can
conflict with each other. As Zanders has argued in
relation to constraints against chemical and biological
warfare, international law itself consists of many
competing doctrines (such as the right to self-defence
and the need to limit the methods of war). This has
meant the stigmas associated with weapons have
formed over time in a complex manner. 70 
Different suggestions have been offered to general
questions over how norms become consequential or
important.71 Within scholarly debates, there are
discussions about whether a particular norm is followed
because it fits into the hierarchical relations between the
competing norms,72 or on the basis of its characteristics
(e.g., its specificity),73 or how it resonates with other
existing norms.74 Arguably though, any general account
of why norms matter presents an idealised view that
passes over how they influence behaviour within their
particular social and political settings.
The upshot of these arguments is that the relevance of
norms – what it means to follow or deviate from them as
well as what consequences are likely to result from their
transgression – must be managed. In this sense, norms
are not so much simple standards for guiding action,
but resources drawn on to account for and give meaning
to particular actions and situations (both potential 
and actual).
In this process of managing the meaning of norms,
active engagement such as questioning whether 
actions are consistent with a norm, undertaken by
stakeholders, is important in ensuring that standards
do not deteriorate over time. For instance, Article IV 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty states that:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
Treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.
This provision could have provided the basis for moving
beyond the current stigmatization of the use of nuclear
weapons to include their possession. However, it would
be difficult to substantiate the claim that nuclear
powers have or are likely in the near future to move
towards the state of disarmament envisioned in the NPT.
The lack of active attention given to the demands of
Article IV is one reason why states have been able to
ignore it with relatively little consequence. 
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As mentioned previously, some countries during the
conferences of the Oslo Process have voiced reservations
about the ultimate effectiveness of a prohibition unless it
includes most or all major user and stockpiling nations. 
In contrast to such arguments, this report has
documented how limits on the methods and means of
warfare offered through treaties and conventions can play
a wider ethical standard setting function across much of
the international community. In the past, prohibitions of
major categories of weapons have had relevance far
beyond their formal terms and official signatories.
Those states taking part in the Dublin Conference have
a historic opportunity to help foster strong standards
for protecting civilians in armed conflict. The choices
made as to exactly what kind of a prohibition is agreed
will greatly affect how the spirit of the prohibition
influences the practice of states both inside and 
outside the Oslo Process. 
The terms of the treaty 
The terms of the prohibition established through the
Oslo Process cannot in isolation determine the eventual
ethical standings given to cluster munitions
internationally. Much will depend on how the
prohibition is policed and promulgated in the future.
Yet, the terms will act as basic resources for later
actions and debates. A clear and comprehensive
prohibition is more likely than a complicated and
qualified one to contribute to the stigmatising of 
these weapons.75 An important question for the 
Dublin Conference then is how the current draft 
treaty text fares in relation to matters of stigma.
In this regard, the ‘Draft Cluster Munitions Convention’
has a number of highly positive features. In a parallel
manner to the BTWC and the CWC, the definition
provides for exclusions in relation to a broad category.
So Article 1 includes the provisions that 
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any
circumstances to:
(a) use cluster munitions;
(b) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile,
retain or transfer to anyone, directly or
indirectly, cluster munitions;76
Article 2 then elaborates key terms including that:
“Cluster munition” means a munition that is
designed to disperse or release explosive sub-
munitions, and includes those explosive sub-
munitions. It does not mean the following:
(a) a munition or sub-munition designed to
dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff;
(b) a munition or sub-munition designed to produce
electrical or electronic effects;
(c) ...
As such, the ‘Draft Cluster Munitions Convention’ text
represents a categorical prohibition. Certain systems
are currently excluded from the definition of a cluster
munition, but no exceptions are made for particular
types of cluster munitions.77 In this regard, the text
provides the sort of clear distinction needed for singling
out this category of weapons from others. Coupled with
broad prohibitions, this categorical approach can quite
readily provide the basis for effective stigmatization.
Of course, much will depend on any further exclusions
that may be introduced as part of Article 2(c) and any
other such sub-articles. Should the current listing of
two exclusions enlarge into twenty, for example,
attempts to stigmatise cluster munitions as a category
through reference to this convention would likely ring
rather hollow.  
The process of defining 
In relation to stigma though perhaps just as important
as what eventual definition is settled on is how the
definition is being agreed. The current definition
structure means that the burden of proof is on those
that desire further exclusions. So, rather than starting
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The Dublin Conference and the future 
prohibition of cluster munitions 
from a presumption of acceptability until definitely
proven otherwise, the definition has a structure
whereby items (i.e. weapons with submunitions) falling
within the category of ‘cluster munitions’ are regarded
as impermissible until proven otherwise.78 That is, at
this juncture in the Oslo Process they need to be ‘ruled
in’ to the realm of the acceptable rather than ‘ruled out.’
This approach stands in sharp contrast to the manner in
which clusters munitions have been treated within fora
such as the CCW. 
To elaborate, as formulated in Additional Protocol I
(1977) of the Geneva Conventions, international
humanitarian law (IHL) consists of rules such as the 
rule on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, 
the rule of distinction, the rule against indiscriminate
attacks, the rule of proportionality, and the rule of
feasible precautions.79 The ‘weighing’ of military
necessity against humanity, as set up in IHL, provides 
a rationalistic cost-benefit framework for evaluating
weapons. Within this framework it is held that
justification of a categorical ban requires convincing
proof that the humanitarian impact will be judged ‘too
great’ in any or all conflict circumstances. In past
negotiations in the CCW as elsewhere,80 even the
hypothetical possibility that a certain weapon might be
used in a manner appropriate under IHL has been enough
to weaken attempts at establishing prohibitions.81
The current route for agreeing a definition within 
the Oslo Process challenges the case-by-case manner 
in which the rules of IHL are often applied to the
evaluation of specific weapon types. Within the Vienna
and Wellington meetings of the Oslo process, the
definition structure has meant it has been for states 
to argue for what should be retained rather than what
should be withdrawn. In other words, instead of
requiring those concerned about humanitarian effects
to make a negative case against these weapons, the
burden of proof has been with proponents to make a
positive case.
This reverse ‘prohibit until proven otherwise’ orientation
is justified by the 40 or more years of concerns at the
humanitarian effects of cluster munitions and the failure
of state practice to rectify such concerns.82
This orientation to risks (novel within arms control
negotiations at least) underscores the depth of concern
about cluster munitions and establishes a firm future
ethical basis for treating them as exceptional compared
to other force options.  
The Dublin Conference 
In the Dublin Conference, states should consider 
how modifications made to the current ‘Draft Cluster
Munitions Convention’ would bear on the future
standing of these weapons with the international
community vis-à-vis their stigmatization. The current
formulation of the text, as a categorical prohibition on
cluster munitions, provides a clear message regarding
their standing for states in the Oslo Process. 
It follows that those interested in stigmatizing cluster
munitions should attach significant importance to keeping
the terms of the convention clear of complicating
modifications that would weaken its potential moral force. 
In this regard, whatever the short-term merits and
drawbacks associated with introducing a transition 
period or qualifying language regarding the meaning of
‘assistance’ because of interoperability concerns, such
measures threaten to undermine the broader stigmatizing
potential of the convention. At least in the medium term,
allowing states to retain weapons for a transition period
that are formally considered unacceptable would
significantly weaken the moral coherence of the treaty.
Introducing qualifying language regarding assistance
would open a space for the acceptability of cluster
munitions (as defined by the convention) not currently 
in place for APMs.  
One objection to such remarks is that without
modifications for transition periods and interoperability
certain countries might not sign up to the convention
established at the Dublin conference. While the number
and type of states agreeing to the convention will likely
bear on its eventual force in international standard
setting, this consideration also needs to be set against
a central argument of this report: conventions can have
a wide-ranging standard setting function that has
implications far beyond their formal parties.  
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Those several countries currently part of the Oslo
Process actively voicing concerns that ‘interoperability’
and ‘transition periods’ will affect whether they become
signatories to the convention need to consider whether
in practice they would contravene its provisions anyway.
In almost any likely future conflict scenarios, the use of
cluster munitions as prohibited through the Oslo
Process would undermine claims for the legitimacy of
that use of force even by a state not party to the treaty.
This effect will be even stronger on any states that have
participated in the process but then chosen not to
become States Parties. The level of state, civil society
and media scrutiny of any use of cluster munitions
should ensure that the humanitarian impact of any 
such use is widely publicised and held up for
evaluation. Thus, states are likely to find themselves
constrained by outcomes of this process whether they
are formally signed up to it or not. 
In contrast, those several dozens of countries currently
part of the Oslo Process voicing their active
commitment to securing a comprehensive prohibition
on cluster munitions have the opportunity to establish
important humanitarian standards, both legal and
normative, for the international community.
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